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EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND GENDER AS DRIVERS OF FORECAST ERRORS  
Katja Rost, Margit Osterloh 
Abstract:  
A factor that unquestionably amplified the magnitude of the financial crisis was widespread 
miscalculation by banks and investors. It raises the question why most directors in the bank 
did not have the foresight to predict the problems of taking on too much risk. This article 
argues that one reason for these failures may be the under-representation of varied educational 
backgrounds and differentiated viewpoints in boards. Psychological economics shows that 
experts and males have the tendency to underestimate the probability of non-typical or 
negative events. Literature further demonstrates that especially homogeneous groups often 
engage in herding behavior and thus cause systematic risks. Using a dataset which has been 
collected shortly before the financial system was in danger of collapsing we demonstrate that 
females and persons with a non-economic-background were significantly more able to predict 
the collapsing stock market prices whereas males with an economic background made by fare 
the worst predictions. A second data sample supports these findings for decision making in a 
strategic context. The results show that banks which relied on decision committees with a 
higher percentage of non-economists are less affected by the financial crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2007, a loss of confidence by investors in the value of securitized mortgages in the 
United States resulted in a liquidity crisis. In September 2008, the global financial crisis 
emerged with the failure of several large financial firms, e.g. the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers (11.09.2008), the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America (11.09.2008), the 
liquidity crisis of American International Group (16.09.2008), the bailout plans for Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley (21.09.2008), the seizure of Washington Mutual (23.09.2009), the 
nationalization of Fortis (28.09.2009), or the acquisition of Wachovia by Citigroup 
(29.09.2008). The credit crisis of financial firms spread around the globe and in 2008-2009 
much of the industrialized world entered into a recession. 
The underlying causes leading to the crisis are hotly discussed. A factor that unquestionably 
amplified the magnitude of the financial crisis was widespread miscalculation by banks and 
investors. First, they systematized the risk by taking advantage of low interest rates to borrow 
tremendous sums of money that they could only pay back if the housing market continued to 
increase in value. Most banks and investors trusted in David X. Li's Gaussian copula model 
function (Li, 2000). This formula was highly tractable because it assumes that the price of 
Credit Default Swaps predicts the correct price of mortgage backed securities (Salmon, 
17.03.2009). Relying on this formula from late 2005 to the middle of 2007 banks issued huge 
packages of Credit Default Swaps, of which many were created from risky mortgage-backed 
bonds. The pricing model however clearly did not reflect the level of risk (Marshall, 
02.03.2009). The massive losses have dramatically impacted the balance sheets of banks 
leaving them with little capital to continue operations. Second, banks systematized the risk by 
counting on liquid credit markets, i.e. they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase 
long-term, illiquid and risky assets. Paul Krugman described the run on this "parallel" banking 
system as the core of what happened to cause the crisis (Krugman, 2009). In early 2007 the 
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self-reinforcing asset prices of the "parallel" banking system even surpassed conventional 
banking.  
The causes leading to the crisis raise the question why most directors in the bank and 
insurance industry did not have the foresight to predict the problems of taking on too much 
risk (Mundy, 11.10.2008). In the banking industry, even when problems became apparent, 
few managers or directors of banks spoke up (Steverman & Bogoslaw, 11.10.2008). They still 
believed in the rationality of their behavior and ignored the systematic risks. This article 
argues that one reason for these failures may be the under-representation of varied educational 
backgrounds and differentiated viewpoints. Most corporate boards – especially within the 
financial sector – mainly consist of males with a managerial background (Daily, et al., 1999; 
Rost and Osterloh, 2008). Psychological economics shows that experts and males have the 
tendency to underestimate the probability of non-typical or negative events (Ricciardi, 2008; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Literature further demonstrates that especially homogeneous 
groups often engage in herding behavior and thus cause systematic risks (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, et al., 1992; Chamley and Gale, 1994).  
The first aim of our study is thus to analyze whether education and gender are drivers of 
individual forecasting errors. Psychological economics assumes that subjective risk factors 
systematically influence decision making processes, e.g. experts have the tendency to over- or 
underestimate the probability of non-typical events and men compared with women have a 
higher tolerance of risk and thus may underestimate the probability of unlikely negative 
events (Fehr-Duda, et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Relying on this literature we 
hypothesize that in the situation where the financial crisis was on the horizon experts and men 
were less able to forecast the collapsing stock market prices. We explore individual 
forecasting errors in study 1 with a dataset which has been collected shortly before the 
financial system was in danger of collapsing, i.e. in April 2008. We analyze the accuracy of 
stock market forecasts with the example of the Swiss bank UBS by comparing the forecasts 
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with the true UBS stock price two month later. The situation for market forecasts was non-
typical: At this time UBS was the first Swiss bank which heavily struggled with significantly 
wrong speculations in context with the mortgage crises and from November 2007 to mid-
March 2008 the UBS stock price dropped dramatically. After the announcement of 
considerable losses in the quarterly report, i.e. from mid-March 2008 to the start of April 
2008, the UBS stock price however recovered. At this time we conducted the survey. Within 
the forecast horizon, i.e. from mid-April 2008 to mid-July 2008, the bank announced even 
more sub-prime write-offs and the UBS stock price dramatically declined again. Two month 
later the global financial crisis emerged and many Swiss banks announced considerable 
losses.  
The second aim of our study is to analyze the consequences of individual forecast errors for 
strategic management. Literature suggests that the illusion of invulnerability makes especially 
homogeneous groups incapable of forecasting the problems caused by their irrational 
behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; Chamley and Gale, 
1994). We therefore postulate that banks in which the board of directors mainly consists of 
males with a managerial background more heavily engaged in lucrative "parallel" banking 
and took advantage of Credit Default Swaps. We hypothesize that before the financial crisis 
such banks outperformed banks consisting of fewer males and of fewer directors with a 
managerial background, while after the financial crisis emerged the first banks 
underperformed the second banks. Finally, we hypothesize that the shareholders of banks with 
homogenous boardrooms lost more money compared to the shareholders of banks with more 
diverse boardrooms. We explore group behaviour in study 2 with a dataset of Swiss banks. 
We test if the stock market performance of banks before and after the financial crisis is 
influenced by the percentage of directors having a background in management education and 
the percentage of male directors.   
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INDIVIDUAL FORECAST ERRORS 
In mainstream economic theory actors are considered to be self-interested maximizer 
endowed to be unlimited information-processing and analytical faculties (Debreu and Scarf, 
1963). Current applications are the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991) and 
modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). Over the last decades, however, a large literature 
has accumulated that shows that individuals face cognitive and emotional constraints (Frey 
and Benz, 2004). In reality many markets (Uzzi, 1997) – even stock markets (Baker, 1990) – 
depart systematically from mainstream economic theory (Frey, 1999; Granovetter, 1985). 
Cognitive psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and psychological economics 
(Frey and Benz, 2004) pick up this criticism by starting from the assumptions of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1991), of bounded willpower1 (Elster, 1999; Jolls, et al., 1998), and of 
bounded self-interest2 (Fehr, et al., 2003a; Fehr, et al., 2003b).  
We restrict our discussion to bounded rationality, i.e. it is assumed that mainstream economic 
theory does not sufficiently describe individual behaviour under risk and uncertainty 
(McDonald and Stehle, 1975). First, within such situations the idea of case-by-case 
optimization is relaxed and instead individuals use simple rules of thumb, or heuristics 
(Basov, et al., 2007). The use heuristics has been called behavioral anomalies (Ellsberg, 1961) 
and has been empirically validated in numerous experiments (Dawes, 1988; Kahneman and 
Lovallo, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Example of behavioral anomalies are the sunk cost effect, the opportunity cost effect, the 
endowment effect, preference reversal, the availability bias, anchoring, the reference point 
effect, or framing (Frey and Benz, 2004). Behavioral anomalies can explain why experts have 
the tendency to over- or underestimate the probability of non-typical events.  Second, under 
                                                 
1
 i.e. persons often take actions that they know to be in conflict with their own long-term interest. 
2
 i.e. people care about being treated fairly and want to treat others fairly if those others are themselves behaving 
fairly. 
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risk and uncertainty the idea of rational decision making is relaxed and instead human 
decisions can also be constrained by emotions (Frey and Benz, 2004). Emotional decisions are 
typically very fast and may use some logic, but the main driving force is emotion, which 
either overrides logic or uses a pseudo-logic to support emotional choices (Loewenstein, et 
al., 2001). The role of emotions in  human decision making has been experimentally validated 
(Naqvi, et al., 2006). Emotions may explain why men compared with women have a higher 
tolerance of risk and thus underestimate the probability of unlikely negative events (Fehr-
Duda, de Gennaro and Schubert, 2006).  
Education as a driver of forecast errors 
Psychological literature supports that especially experts often fall victim to an oversight trap 
(Arkes, et al., 1986; Fox and Clemen, 2005; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Paese and Feuer, 
1991; Spense, 1996). For example it has been shown that experts often overestimate the 
precision of their information and draw wrong conclusions with regard to estimating the 
probabilities of random outcomes, e.g., clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1965), physicians and 
nurses (Baumann, et al., 1991; Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981), engineers (Kidd, 
1970), entrepreneurs (Cooper, et al., 1988; Hayward, et al., 2006), investment bankers (von 
Holstein, 1972), stock market forecasters (Deaves, et al., 2005), or security analysts (Bar-
Yosef and Venezia, 2006).  
The literature explains the cognitive biases of experts by referring to special information and 
past experiences which distinguish experts from novices and less experienced people 
(Litterer, 1965). Experts have an intense experience through education and practice in a 
particular field. Their familiarity in a particular field of study enables them to rapidly retrieve 
complex configurations of information from long-term memory (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2005). 
For example, investors utilize familiarity heuristics when they have to assess difficult 
financial circumstances and investment choices within a narrow timeframe (Ricciardi and 
Simon, 2001). However, familiarity can be inappropriate when situations are characterized by 
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modified and non-typical circumstances. Experts in a non-typical situation often reason that 
prior knowledge can be correctly applied to the new situation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). 
Prior literature explains the tendency of experts to over- or underestimates the probability of 
non-typical events by the following reasons: 
First, experts focus too much on the circumstances underlying “typical” events and too little 
on the circumstances underlying a specific event. This human tendency is referred to as 
availability, status quo or representativeness bias (Fox, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). 
It suggests that the likelihood of events is estimated based on how many examples of such 
events come to mind (Fox and Tversky, 1995). Individuals who are subject to this bias prefer 
the current state, ignore relevant facts that should be included in the decision-making process 
and thus predict uncertain future events by taking a small portion of data and drawing a 
holistic conclusion (Fox and Hadar, 2006; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).  
Second, experts may be overconfident in existing scientific knowledge and thus ignore how 
certain factors perform together as a whole (Slovic, et al., 1985). Overconfidence means that 
humans have an inclination to overestimate their own skills, abilities, and predictions for 
success (Ricciardi and Simon, 2001).  
Third, experts may be more prone to anchoring. Anchoring explains the strong inclination to 
latch on to a belief, that may or may not be truthful, and to use it as a reference point for 
upcoming decisions (Hammond, et al., 1998). One of the most frequent anchors is a past 
event or trend (Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975). Compared with less experienced people experts 
have more knowledge about past events or trends and thus may also have a higher probability 
by selecting trends as an initial reference point. It has been shown that hindsight biased 
investment bankers overreact to information signals, conduct incorrect, learning about 
volatility, and engage in suboptimal investment decisions (Biais and Weber, 2007).  
Fourth, experts may have a higher illusion of control (Langer, 1975). It makes a person 
believe that he or she can control the outcome of a random decision or situation based on their 
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skills (Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). Experts may assume that they have a greater ability to 
foresee and navigate potential hazards and therefore may systematically underestimate risks 
(Powell, et al., 2006).  
There exists a huge number of empirical evidence suggesting that such cognitive biases also 
affect business decisions to a large extent (Bruner, 2005; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; 
Lovallo and Sibony, 2006; Powell, Lovallo and Caringal, 2006; Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). 
It has been shown that biased executives exhibit high investment-cash flow sensitivity 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005), engage intensively in unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions 
(Lovallo, et al., 2007; Malmendier and Tate, forthcoming; Roll, 1986), are convinced about 
finding hidden synergies and about selecting the best targets for their company (Doukas and 
Petzemas, 2007), show a willingness to overpay for acquisitions (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997), avoid tapping the capital markets (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2006), execute stock 
options only shortly before they expire (Malmendier and Tate, 2003), think that the total 
profit earned by all other business entrants will be negative, but their own profit will be 
positive (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), or that CEOs who feel “above average” are more likely 
to manage earnings to meet these forecasts (Hribar and Yang, 2006).  
Empirical evidence further indicates that there is a pronounced “CFO effect” in corporate 
decisions (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). CFOs are experts concerning capital structure, payout, 
and capital allocation decisions (Graham and Harvey, 2001). The research of Ben-David et al. 
(2007) demonstrates that overconfidence and optimism are persistent characteristics of CFOs: 
they are more confident following periods of high market return and less confident following 
low market returns periods. This finding is consistent with the significant amount of literature 
in the field of behavioral finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Ricciardi, 2004; Ricciardi and 
Simon, 2000) which shows that especially financial experts put too much emphasis on the 
latest, most striking news and too little on base-rate information (Daniel, et al., 2001). Ben-
David et al. (2007) demonstrate that the cognitive biases of CFOs have far-reaching and 
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negative consequences for shareholders: Firms with overconfident CFOs invest more and 
engage in more acquisition, are less likely to pay dividends, instead using the funds to make 
investments, have higher debt ratios, and rely more heavily on long-term debt. There is much 
further evidence suggesting that the familiarity bias under uncertainty operates in capital 
market decisions as well.3  
Relying on this literature we hypothesize that within the situation where rapidly increasing 
housing prices heralded a bubble the stock market forecasts of financial experts were less 
valid compared with the forecast of non-financial experts. Under financial experts we 
understand individuals with financial education, financial experience or with beliefs which go 
along with financial backgrounds.  
Hypothesis 1. In the situation where harbingers of the financial crisis were obvious the stock 
market forecasts of financial experts were systematically less valid compared with the stock 
market forecasts of non-financial experts, i.e. financial experts were less able to forecast the 
collapsing stock market prices. 
Gender as a driver of forecast errors 
Women are commonly stereotyped as more risk averse than men. Psychologists and 
sociologists find strong gender-specific differences in responses to non-financial risks which 
                                                 
3
 For example people remain for long periods of time to the default option offered by their firm and make no 
changes to the composition of their retirement portfolios Madrian, B. and Shea, D. (2001) The Power of 
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1149-
1525.. U.S. investment managers invest disproportionately in locally headquartered firms Coval, J. and 
Moskowitz, T. (1999) Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios, Journal of Finance, 
54, 1695-1704.. Investors tend to hold the shares of firms that have nearby head-quarters and communicate in 
investors' native tongue Grinblatt, M. and Keloharju, M. (2001) How Distance, Language and Culture Infuence 
Stockholdings and Trades, Journal of Finance, 56, 1053-1073.. Investors concentrate holdings in stocks to which 
the investor is geographically or professionally close or that he has held for a long period Massa, M. and 
Simonov, A. (2006) Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice, Review of Financial Studies, 19, 633-685.. 
Portfolio managers have more pessimistic expectations about foreign stocks than about domestic stocks Strong, 
N. C. and Xu, X. (2003) Understanding the Equity Home Bias: Evidence from Survey Data, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 85, 307-312.. In international financial markets, investors tend to hold domestic assets 
instead of diversifying across countries French, K. and Poterba, J. (1991) Investor Diversification and 
International Equity Markets, American Economic Review, 81, 222-226.. Firms tend to cross list their stocks in 
countries where investors are more familiar with the firms to be listed Pagano, M., Roell, A. A. and Zechner, J. 
(2002) The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?, Journal of Finance, 67, 2651-2694.. 
Lower levels of trust toward citizens of a country lead to less trade with that country, less portfolio allocation to 
assets in that country, and less direct investment in that country Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2007) 
Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?, European University Institute Working Paper 2007/42.. 
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are particularly pronounced when it comes to physical or life-threatening risks (Byrnes et al., 
1999). Surprisingly, little work has been done however on gender-specific differences in 
financial decision making. Studies based on field data conclude that women are relatively 
more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2002). Gender differences in risk taking 
may be due to differences in valuations of outcomes or in probability weights. The results of 
laboratory experiments indicate that value functions do not differ significantly between men 
and women; but in specific circumstances women appear to be more risk averse than men 
(Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro and Schubert, 2006). They authors find that (a) women are less 
sensitive to changes in probability than are men, (b) women underestimate large probabilities 
of gains more strongly than do men, (c) women tend to be especially pessimistic when 
winning gambles are framed in investment terms. These results are confirmed in other 
laboratory experiments (Harbaugh, et al., 2002). Other studies further illustrate that gender is 
highly significant when interaction terms with overconfidence and financial market 
knowledge are taken into account (Gysler, et al., 2002). With increasing objectively measured 
knowledge, men are more risk averse while women tend to be relatively more risk prone. It 
might be the case that women with a low level of knowledge and experience in financial 
matters feel less competent, therefore, behave risk averse (Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro and 
Schubert, 2006). Another possible explanation could lie in women’s stronger emotionality, 
i.e. women react much more intensely to feelings of disappointment and elation than do men 
(Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro and Schubert, 2006). It has been shown that “mood” is an important 
driver of investment decisions (Yuan, et al., 2006), that decision makers have feelings of 
disappointment if ex post events fall outside a “normal” range (Walther, 2003) and that 
people who are incapable of feeling emotions as a result of brain lesions accept more risk with 
high rewards (Shiv, et al., 2005). Emotional reactions more often occur under uncertainty 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch, 2001) and might be especially pronounced for 
women. 
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There is a great deal of literature which supports that women and men react differently 
emotionally and that these reactions influence the judgment process and decision making (for 
an extensive overview see: Ricciardi, 2008). This literature points out that females reveal a 
greater level of worry than man. It has been shown that women have a more negative problem 
orientation then men and have more unfocused worries which are not necessarily connected to 
recent stressful events (Robichaud, et al., 2003). They tend “to worry about a wide range of 
subject matter such as their personal and professional relationships, finances, money, 
economic conditions, work experiences, retirement issues, family problems, educational 
topics, sexual relations, safety concerns, and health issues” (Ricciardi, 2008: 20). From a 
psychological perspective “worrying is often seen as a constructive occupation that helps to 
solve potential problems” (Davey, 1994: 35). Many researchers have noted that uncertainty 
represents an important variable in our understanding of worry (e.g. Dugas, et al., 1997; 
Dugas, et al., 2001). At a general level, individuals who worry show a higher intolerance of 
uncertainty, i.e. they consider it unacceptable that a negative event may occur, however small 
the probability of its occurrence (MacLeod, et al., 1991). The literature therefore suggests that 
women much more intensely consider it unacceptable that a negative event may occur, 
however small the probability of its occurrence, than do men. It seems therefore plausible that 
women underestimate large probabilities of gains: it helps them to avoid strong feelings of 
disappointment if the ex post event entails losses. Emotional reactions could thus explain why 
women appear to be more risk averse than men in winning circumstances. As a consequence 
women are also less sensitive to changes in probability. 
Financial literature has so far in particular focused on the negative effects of risk aversion or 
worry (Ricciardi, 2004). For example it has been demonstrated that students who worry about 
money perform less well then their peers in degree examinations (Ross, et al., 2006). Further, 
the higher risk aversion of women may also to some extant explain the phenomenon of “glass 
ceiling” – a barrier of prejudice and discrimination that exclude women from higher 
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leadership positions (Morrison, et al., 1987). However, in some situations risk aversion and 
emotionality might be helpful, for example by forecasting unlikely negative outcomes. It has 
been shown that managers in the presence of affective reactions tend to reject investment 
alternatives that elicited a negative effect (Moreno, et al., 2002). For this reason we 
hypothesize that at times where rapidly increasing housing prices heralded a bubble the stock 
market forecasts of men were less valid compared with the forecast of women. Risk aversion, 
emotionality and negative problem orientation helped women by reflecting on multiple past 
circumstances and therefore by forecasting the unlikely negative outcome of collapsing stock 
market prices.   
Hypothesis 2. In the situation where harbingers of the financial crisis were obvious the stock 
market forecasts of men were systematically less valid compared with the stock market 
forecasts of women, i.e. men were less able to forecast the collapsing stock market prices. 
Because we assume that experts as well as men were less able to forecast the collapsing stock 
market prices, we additionally hypothesize that male experts made by fare the worst 
predictions.  
Hypothesis 3. In the situation where harbingers of the financial crisis were obvious the stock 
market forecasts of male experts were systematically less valid compared with the stock 
market forecasts of female experts, female non-experts or male non-experts. 
FORECAST ERRORS BY GROUPS 
Finally we discuss the consequences of individual forecast errors for strategic management. It 
is well known that corporate boards in most countries mainly consist of males with an 
economic background (Daily, Certo and Dalton, 1999; Rost and Osterloh, 2008). The under-
representation of women and of persons with a lower level of knowledge in financial matters 
shapes homogenous boardrooms. Homogenous groups however multiply the former specified 
forecast errors of individuals, i.e. of experts and of men, because such groups are prone to 
group think. The theory of group think was proposed by Janis (1972; 1982). He “hypothesizes 
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that decision making groups are most likely to experience groupthink when they are highly 
cohesive, insulated from experts, perform limited search and appraisal of information, operate 
under directed leadership, and experience conditions of high stress with low self-esteem and 
little hope of finding a better solution to a pressing problem than that favored by the leader or 
influential members" (Turner and Pratkanis, 1998: 105). These conditions are assumed to lead 
to two symptoms of groupthink (Katz and Kahn, 1966). The first symptom includes the 
illusion of invulnerability, stereotyping of out-groups, self-censorship and the belief in the 
inherent morality of the group (Leahy, 1992). The second symptom involves the incomplete 
survey of alternatives and objectives, poor information searching, failure to appraise the risks 
of the preferred solution and selective information processing (Turner and Pratkanis, 1998). 
These combined forces are found to result in extremely poor decision making by the group.  
Psychological literature offers different explanations for the underlying mechanisms which 
foster group think. For most explanations the behavior theory of Heider (1958) constitutes the 
theoretical basis. It indicates that actors strive for orientation and adequate reaction to their 
environment in order to anticipate the consequences of their actions. Information from the 
environment, e.g. characteristics, opinions, capabilities and behavior patterns of other people, 
is collected and compared with their own characteristics, opinions, capabilities and behavior. 
This comparison is simplified if actors are members of the same group. The theory postulates 
that people perceive situations as being less comfortable when they are confronted with a 
diverse group of individuals.  For this reason people try to reach conformity within groups, 
first by excluding individuals with different and immutable characteristics and second, by 
changing their opinions and behavior accordingly. The first argument may explain the 
phenomenon of “glass ceiling” – a barrier of prejudice and discrimination that exclude 
women or persons with non-management backgrounds from higher leadership positions 
(Morrison, White and Van Velsor, 1987). The second argument explains why such groups 
tend to produce homogenous beliefs and behavior.  
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Psychological literature postulates that in particular in situations in which the environment 
radically changes, i.e. under uncertainty, group think results in forecast errors and poor 
decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Environment changes often destroy the 
usefulness of established knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). Groups which are infected by group think under such circumstances often come to 
wrong decisions. They systematically underestimate alternative explanations by failing to re-
evaluate the new situation (Katz and Allen, 1982).  
In summary, psychological literature suggests that homogenous groups are characterized by 
group think and in particular in situations in which the environment radically changes come to 
poor decisions. Relying on this literature we postulate that banks with boards mainly 
consisting of males with a managerial background made the worst decisions in the situation 
where harbingers of the financial crisis were obvious. We assume that such board more 
heavily supported lucrative "parallel" banking or Credit Default Swap because they believed 
in the rationality of this behaviour. Such a behavior implies a higher stock market 
performance before the financial crisis emerged: at this time most investors still had a high 
confidence in the value of securitized mortgages and in liquid markets. This behavior further 
implies a lower stock market performance after the financial crisis emerged: "parallel" 
banking or Credit Default Swap clearly did not reflect the level of risk. The assumption of 
poor decision making finally implies that the shareholders of banks with homogenous 
boardrooms lost more money compared to the shareholders of banks with more diverse 
boardrooms. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the percentage of males and economists within the board of a bank 
before the financial crisis was, the higher was the stock market performance of this bank 
before the financial crisis emerged. 
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Hypothesis 5. The higher the percentage of males and economists within the board of a bank 
before the financial crisis was, the lower was the stock market performance of this bank after 
the financial crisis emerged. 
Hypothesis 6. The higher the percentage of males and economists within the board of a bank 
before the financial crisis was the more money shareholders altogether lost. 
STUDY 1: INDIVIDUAL FORECAST ERRORS  
Sample 
We conducted a survey within the time where harbingers of the financial crisis were already 
obvious, but the extent of the financial crisis was unknown. The survey was conducted from 
3.04.2008 to 8.04.2008. Our sample consists of 479 students at the University of Zurich and 
the ETH (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule4) from various fields of study, i.e. students 
in management, economy, finance, social science, engineering etc. Participants were required 
to forecast a future event in the stock market. More precisely we analyzed the accuracy of 
stock market forecasts with the example of the Swiss bank UBS by comparing the forecasts 
with the true UBS stock price two month later.  
We choose UBS for two reasons: First, as a consequence of significantly wrong speculations 
in context with the mortgage crises in the second half of the year 2007 and the first quarter of 
the year 2008, the UBS stock price started to drop dramatically, i.e. from 80 SFR down to 27 
SFR. The UBS case was also the most prominent in the Swiss public media, e.g. in 
newspapers, TV, radio, talk-shows etc. Thus, even people with no financial interests or no 
expertise had a great deal of information about the UBS case. Second, after the announcement 
of considerable losses in the quarterly report, the UBS stock price recovered and started to 
increase again, i.e. in the month before we conducted our study the share prices increased 
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from 27 SFR up to 33 SFR. The situation for market forecasts was non-typical, i.e. it was 
characterized through highly volatile stock prices and a high amount of uncertainty.  
Figure 1 illustrates the study design and the development of the UBS share price. From 
November 2007 to mid-March 2008 the UBS share price dramatically collapsed as a 
consequence of significant wrong speculations. In the month before the survey was 
conducted, i.e. from mid-March 2008 to the start of April 2008, the UBS share price increased 
temporarily. The background was the belief that all sub-prime write-downs were included in 
the quarterly report. Within the forecast horizon, i.e. from mid-April 2008 to mid-July 2008, 
the UBS share price dramatically declined again, because the bank announced even more sub-
prime write-offs. In September/October 2008 the bank has so far been forced to write off 
about $43 billion and has had to be supported by the Swiss government. In November 2008 
the shares of the UBS had a value around 10 SFR. Shares were worth four times less than 
they were five years earlier.  
Figure 1 about here 
In the time period when the survey was conducted a recurrence of fall in prices was contra-
intuitive for most people. As we will demonstrate later only 21% of the participants expected 
such a development. 54% of the participants put emphasis on the latest, most striking news, 
e.g. the recovery of the UBS share price in context with the belief that the financial situation 
would recover soon and all sub-prime write-offs were included in the UBS quarterly report.  
In order to reach a high number of students with diverse backgrounds we used a combination 
of two sampling methods, snowball sampling and stratified sampling. 42 students from 
different fields of study, e.g. psychologists, students in finance, management, and economics 
were asked to interview 10-20 students from the University of Zurich as well as from the 
neighboring ETH. In order to ensure a sufficient number of students with financial experience 
it was required that at least 20% of the interviewed students had practical experience in the 
stock market. Our final sample is in a number of areas (e.g. the number of passed semesters, 
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age, grad point average) a true representative sample for the whole University of Zurich and 
the ETH. In other areas, e.g. the overrepresentation of persons with stock market experience 
(35%), the overrepresentation of men (66%), of students with management-related 
background (70%) and in particular of finance students (20%), the sample intentionally does 
not reflect a normal student sample.  
Measurements 
Accuracy of forecasting prediction. The accuracy of forecasting predictions was measured 
by asking the respondents within the time period 3.04.-8.04.2008 about the development of 
the UBS stock price within the next two months (5-point-Scale: 1= UBS stock price will rise 
massively to 5= UBS stock price will fall massively). In order to minimize random 
predictions of irresolute respondents every person also had the possibility to answer “no 
idea”. The distribution of the answers is shown in figure 2. Higher values indicate more 
accurate forecasts because in reality the UBS stock price declined within the forecasting 
period.  
Figure 2 about here 
The following measurements try to capture the independent variable financial expertise. We 
applied different measurements which can be categorized as educational, knowledge, 
experience, information gathering, beliefs and socialization variables.   
Education (Field of study). The participants were asked about their main field of study. 30% 
of all participants have a non-management-related background, i.e. they have a background in 
natural sciences (15%) or in humanities/social sciences (15%). The remaining 70% have a 
management-related background. In the following we contrast these students against students 
with non-management-related backgrounds. Students with management-related background 
were classified into four different fields of management education: (1) finance (0= no, 1= 
yes), (2) economics (0= no, 1= yes), (3) management (0= no, 1= yes), and (4) management 
and economics, i.e. an all-rounder education in economics and management (0= no, 1= yes).  
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Knowledge. Knowledge about financial issues and stock markets was measured by three 
items. On a general level the respondents were asked on a 5-point scale how they evaluate 
their knowledge of stock markets (1= uninformed, 5= expert). Furthermore, we asked if the 
students have ever attended lectures about stock markets or financial issues (0= no, 1= yes) 
and if the students dabble in stocks and shares (0= no, 1= yes). As a consequence of our 
sampling method the students who are active on stock markets with their own money, is 
overrepresented with 35%.   
Experience. Experiences within the real financial sector were measured by two items. Most 
Swiss students are employed part time outside of their university studies. We asked if the 
students are employed within the financial sector (0= no, 1= yes). In fact, 20% have a job 
within the financial sector. Furthermore, incentive pay, i.e. bonus pay or variable pay through 
shares and stock options, is most common within the financial sector. We asked if the 
students are paid via incentive pay within their jobs (0= no, 1= yes). 19% of the respondents 
answered yes. 
Information. The amount of knowledge is influenced by the kind of information gathering. 
We asked the participants which newspaper sections they read regularly. We differentiated 
between regular information about “economy” and/or “finance” (0= no, 1= yes), about 
“national politics” and/or “international politics” (0= no, 1= yes), and about “society” 
including sports, culture, and/or gossip (0= no, 1= yes).   
Beliefs. Beliefs are influenced by the kind of education and the kind of knowledge. Economic 
or financial experts often believe in standard economic theory, e.g. in the invisible hand of 
markets. In order to capture these beliefs we asked the respondents to agree on five items by 
using a 5-point scale (1= totally disagree to 5= totally agree). These items were: (1) “I have a 
high trust in banks”. (2) “Competent managers were aware of the mortgage crisis”. (3) “Top 
CEOs are more talented than other economic participants”. (4) “Principal-agent-theory’s 
predications are always true”. (5) “The increase in CEO salaries is market-conform”. We ran 
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a principal-component analysis and a Cronbach's Alpha test in order to test the consistency of 
the scale. The items formed one component. The Cronbach's Alpha test indicates that all items 
measure one construct since every item improves the Cronbach's Alpha of the overall scale 
(=.55). For each person we averaged the values of the items 1-5. Higher values indicate a 
higher trust in self-regulating markets.  
Beliefs might be reflected in professional career wishes as well. We asked the respondents 
where they see themselves within the next 10 years, i.e. as a normal employee, as a manager, 
as a top-manager, as an entrepreneur, or as a full-time mother/father. From these answers we 
selected two: career as a top-manager (0= no, 1= yes) and career as an entrepreneur (0= no, 
1= yes). Persons who wish to become a top-manager may have more typical expert beliefs.  
Socialization. Socialization might have consequences on forecasting predictions because it 
influences learning processes, beliefs or self-selecting in a field of study. We captured 
socialization by the following items: (1) One parent is working in the finance sector (0= no, 
1= yes). (2) Parents are wealthy (0= no, 1= yes). (3) One parent has a university degree (0= 
no, 1= yes). (4) Parents are active on the stock exchange (0= no, 1= yes). (5) Parents bought 
stocks as a present (0= no, 1= yes). (6) Stock market education through parents (0= no, 1= 
yes).  
Risk orientation. Financial literature discusses an individual’s risk perception or risk 
orientation as an important driver of judgment process and decision making (Ricciardi, 2004). 
Therefore, we additionally included an individual’s risk orientation. We measured risk 
orientation using two alternative measurements.  
First, we asked how much money a person would reinvest in stocks if he/she has bought 
stocks for CHF 1000 and sold these stocks for CHF 2000. Individuals who would reinvest 
more then CHF 1000 were coded as “1” indicating a higher risk orientation. Persons who 
reinvest less or equal then CHF 1000 were coded as “0” indicating a lower risk orientation. 
We call this variable “Willingness to take financial risks”. 
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Second, we measured the general risk orientation of persons by using a multiple item scale 
(1= totally disagree to 5= totally agree). The scale consists of 14 items and includes 
statements like drug consumption, gambling, etc.. We ran a principal-component analysis and 
a Cronbach's Alpha test in order to test the consistency of the scale. The items formed three 
selective components which we labeled as (1) risk as thrill (=.61), (2) risk as breaking the 
law (=.60), and (3) risk as readiness to change (=.39). Component 3, i.e. risk as readiness to 
change, is badly reflected through the measurements. For the sake of completeness we 
included “risk as readiness to change”, even though the results should be interpreted with 
caution. For each person we averaged the values of the items measuring (1) risk as thrill, (2) 
risk as breaking law, and (3) risk as readiness to change. High valued indicate a higher risk 
orientation.  
Demographics. Finally, we took into account certain demographic characteristics. In order to 
test hypothesis 2, we asked the gender of each person (0= female, 1=male). Furthermore, we 
measured the age of each person (1=19-20, 2=21-22, 3=23-24, 4=25-26, 5=27-28, 6=29-30, 
731), the income per month (0< SFR 1500, 1 SFR 1500), workload beside study (1= 0%, 
2<20%, 3= 21-40%, 4=41-60%, 5>60%), happiness at the university (1=very unhappy to 5= 
very happy), number of passed semesters (from 1 up to 12), grade point average (from 4 up to 
5.7; in Switzerland the grade “4.0” is the minimum required grade to pass an exam and the 
grade “6.0” the best possible grade).  
For descriptive statistics and correlations please conduct the first author.  
Analyses 
We examine the effects of the independent variables on the accuracy of forecast predictions 
by running simple OLS regression analyses, i.e. we assume that our dependent variable has a 
quasi-metric scale. We ran sensitivity tests by comparing these results with the results of logit 
regression analyses using “wrong” and “right” forecasts as our dependent variable and with 
the results of ordinal regression analyses. The results do not significantly differ. Furthermore, 
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we ran sensitivity tests by comparing the OLS results with the results of clustered regression 
analyses. We clustered according to the 42 students who interviewed the 479 students. The 
snowball sampling method does not significantly bias our results. For simplicity we will 
mainly document the results of OLS regression analyses. In the final model we will show the 
results of sensitivity tests. 
Our regression models build on a sample of 355 students. 64 students of the 479 students had 
to been excluded because we have no usable information on the dependent variable “UBS 
stock price forecasts”. Other persons had to been excluded because we have incomplete 
information on some independent variables. Furthermore, since expert knowledge is measured 
using different kinds of indicators, some of these indicators are highly correlated with each 
other. In order to avoid problems caused by multicollinearity, we will run separate models for 
different indicator types. In all partial models we check for demographic characteristics. 
Finally, we will run a model which includes all variables. As these results could be distorted 
by multicollinearity we will also test if the identified significant variables are still significant 
in a model which only includes these drivers. These final results are then tested for sensitivity 
by running a clustered regression and an ordinal regression as well. In order to test for 
interaction effects between gender and expert knowledge we run univariate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).  
Results 
Table 1 documents the results of the regression analyses.  
Table 1 about here 
Gender. In all models gender has significant effects on forecasting predictions. The negative 
effects support hypothesis 2 which predicted that women were more able to forecast the 
collapsing stock market prices. The descriptive analysis shows that 16% of all men made 
accurate forecast predictions. This percentage is for women nearly twice as great and totals 
33%. 
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Expert knowledge. Model I tests whether the field of study has effects on the accuracy of 
forecast predictions in uncertain situations. It turns out that finance and economic students 
were to a significant extent more wrong in their forecast predictions compared with students 
who have no finance or economic background, supporting Hypothesis 1. The descriptive 
analysis shows that 15% of all finance students and 16% of all students of economics made 
accurate forecast predictions. The percentage for non-finance students totals 23% and that for 
non-economic students 22%.  
Model II tests whether knowledge about the stock exchange and finance knowledge 
influences forecasts. We obtained two significant effects supporting hypothesis 1: students 
who visited courses about stock markets and finance and students who are active on the stock 
exchange made less accurate forecasts compared with students who didn’t have this 
knowledge. Descriptive analyses demonstrate that the accurate forecasts of students without 
knowledge were nearly twice as high. 
Model III tests whether experience, i.e. employment in the finance sector or incentive pay, 
influences forecast predictions. Both variables show negative but nonetheless insignificant 
effects.  
Model IV tests the effects of information gathering on forecast predictions. It turns out that 
regular information about economy & finance and about politics has no effects while regular 
information about society increases the likelihood that individuals made more accurate 
forecasts. Thus, the data indirectly supports hypothesis 1 by showing that “non-expert” 
information, i.e. information which is not connected to financial issues, increased the 
accuracy of forecasts.  
Model V tests whether beliefs influence forecasts. In line with hypothesis 1 it turns out that 
people who highly trust in self-regulating, efficient markets made significant less accurate 
forecasts. Career wishes as a top-manager show negative but again insignificant effects on the 
accuracy of forecasts.  
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Model VI and model VII test whether socialization or risk orientation influence forecasting 
predictions. No variable shows significant effects.  
Overall model. Model VIII in table 2 illustrates the results of an overall model. It mainly 
supports the results of the partial models. Males, students who visited courses about stock 
markets and finance, and who highly trust in self-regulating, efficient markets made 
significantly less accurate forecasts supporting hypothesis 1 and 2.  
Sensitivity tests. The models in table 2 test if the results are stable by including only the 
significant variables of the overall model, i.e. gender, finance courses and trust in optimal 
contracts. The results support the former findings indicating that multicollinearity has not 
biased the results. Furthermore, the OLS regression model, the clustered regression model, 
and the ordinal regression model show related findings indicating that the results are not 
sensitive to the kind of method applied. Gender, finance courses and trust in optimal contracts 
explain the accuracy of forecast predictions between 23% and 28% indicating that forecasting 
predictions are to an astonishing high degree systematic influenced.  
Table 2 about here 
Interaction tests. Finally, table 3 tests if the significant indicators of table 2 interact with 
each other, e.g. if in particular males with expert knowledge made most inaccurate forecasts. 
The results clearly support hypotheses 3. A descriptive analyses shows that only 13% and 
12% of these men made accurate forecasts who visited finance courses respectively have 
strong beliefs in mainstream economic knowledge. In contrast, women who never visited 
finance courses respectively have weak beliefs in mainstream economic knowledge made 
42% and 39% accurate forecasts. Women with strong beliefs or expert knowledge 
respectively men with weak beliefs or no expert knowledge made 23% and 27% accurate 
forecasts, which is still significantly better than the forecasts of male experts. The results also 
support that beliefs and education strengthen each other. Finance courses in particular 
negatively affect forecasting accuracy if individuals additionally hold strong beliefs in 
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mainstream economic knowledge. These persons made only 10% accurate forecasts whereas 
the forecast accuracy of persons who share only one or none of these characteristics varies 
between 26% and 35%.  
Table 3 about here 
In summary, the results of study 1 support our hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 by showing that 
knowledge and gender systematically affects the accuracy of forecasting predictions. Women 
and of non-experts were systematically more able to forecast the collapsing stock market 
prices. It is further supported that non-expert females made by far the best forecasts whereas 
expert males made by far the worst forecasts.  
STUDY 2: FORECAST ERRORS BY GROUPS 
Sample 
In order to validate the former findings for groups and for strategic management we collected 
data of all banks listed in the Swiss Market Index (SMI) respectively in the Swiss 
Performance Index (SPI), i.e. overall 30 banks quoted on the Swiss Exchange (SWX). The 
sample is restricted to banks because in our theory we argued that in particular the 
miscalculation by decision makers of banks amplified the magnitude of the financial crisis.  
Measurements 
Performance. We measured shareholder wealth maximization calculating the development of 
the stock price of a bank in percentage at three time intervals: performance before the 
financial crisis (1.1.-1.12.2006), performance within/after the financial crisis (1.3.2008-
1.3.2009), overall performance (1.3.2006-1.3.2009). We stretched the time intervals in order 
to secure the comparability between banks. The time interval before the financial crisis does 
not include the liquidity crisis in July 2007. The time interval within/after the financial crisis 
starts six months before the global financial crisis emerged and includes six months of this 
event. The time interval “overall performance” considers the performance changes of a bank 
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from times without liquidity crisis and without global financial crisis up to time periods after 
these events.  
Board structure. We collected data on the board structure of all banks for the year 2006. At 
this time the balance sheets of banks were healthy and decision makers had the possibility to 
continue investing in Credit Default Swaps or "parallel" banking. We analyzed the curriculum 
vitae of all 450 directors working at this time for the board of one of these banks. 160 
directors work in an executive position and 290 in a non-executive position. We will run 
separate models for executive and non-executive boards. We coded the gender and the 
educational backgrounds of all directors. Educational backgrounds were classified according 
to five categories: (1) economic background including final degrees in business, finance, or 
economics, (2) background in law, (3) background in engineering, (4) background in natural 
sciences including mathematics, (5) backgrounds in social sciences, humanities or arts. As 
educational background we considered study degrees as well as apprenticeships. 52 directors 
had multiple backgrounds and were assigned to each of these backgrounds.  
We calculated the percentage of females within a board by dividing the number of female 
executives respectively non-executives by the total number of executives respectively of non-
executives. We calculated the percentage of non-economist backgrounds within a board by 
dividing the number of non-economist backgrounds of executives respectively of non-
executives by the total number of backgrounds within this committee. We further computed 
two combined measurements: First, we calculated the percentage of directors which are either 
female or/and have a non-economic background. We will term this measurement percentage 
of criss-cross individuals. Study 1 has shown that these persons made significant better 
forecasts than males with an economic background. Second, we calculated the professional 
heterogeneity of a board as D=1-Pi2. Pi represents the percentage of board members 
according to the five categories of educational backgrounds. Small numbers of D 
characterizes boards with a high professional homogeneity. Figure 3 shows for executive and 
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non-executive boards the percentages of female directors and the educational backgrounds of 
directors. The gender and professional diversity of boards is low, in particular for executive 
boards. The data thus contain low variance in order to detect effects.   
Figure 3 about here 
Control variables. Due to the small sample size we are limited by the choice of control 
variables. We control for two variables which seems to us most important in determining the 
market performance of banks before and after the financial crisis. First, we included firm size 
by using the logarithms of the number of employees. Second, we included a dummy variable 
which measure the type of the bank. The variable takes the value 1 if the bank is bank of the 
canton and 0 otherwise. Canton banks are to large parts owned by the Canton (comparable 
with a federal state), are managed under a public performance mandate and often have 
government guarantee. Canton banks have better performed during the financial crisis: the 
stricter control prevented that these banks to take too much risk. Most of them were however 
as well engaged in Credit Default Swaps and "parallel" banking but to a lower degree.  
Analyses 
We examine the effects of board structure on performance by running OLS regression 
analyses for different time periods and by separating between executive and non-executive 
boards. We first test the effects of the percentage of females and the percentage of non-
economist backgrounds on performance. Second, we test the effects of the percentage of criss-
cross individuals on performance. Third, we examine the effects of professional heterogeneity 
on performance. We separate these variables in different models because they are highly 
correlated with each other. For descriptive statistics and correlations please conduct the first 
author.  
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Results 
Non-executive directors. Table 4 shows how the structure of non-executive boards 
influences the performance of banks. The results to some extant support our hypotheses 4, 5 
and 6 by showing that the higher the percentage of non-economist directors before the 
financial crisis was, (a) the significantly lower was the performance of this bank before the 
financial crisis emerged (model I), (b) the significantly higher was the performance of this 
bank after the financial crisis emerged (model II), and (c) the significantly less money 
shareholders altogether lost (model III). The percentage of female directors shows the 
expected signs on performance but the effects are not significant. One likely reason for these 
non significant results is the small variance of the variable, i.e. the percentage of female non-
executive directors only amount 8%. Figure 4 shows descriptively how the number of females 
influences performance. The figure clearly demonstrates that a higher number of females go 
along with (a) a lower performance of this bank before the financial crisis, (b) a higher 
performance of this bank after the financial crisis, and lower shareholder losses concerning 
the overall performance of a bank. 
The results in table 4 further support that a higher percentage of female directors or/and of 
directors with a non-economic background as well as a higher professional diversity of boards 
prevented miscalculations. Both variables correlate negatively with the performance before 
the financial crisis (model I), positively with the performance after the financial crisis (model 
II) and positively with the overall performance (model III). 
Table 4 and Figure 4 about here 
Executive directors. Table 5 shows how the structure of executive boards influences the 
performance of banks. Due to the small variance, i.e. the percentage of female executives’ 
amounts 3% and the percentage of non-economists 12%, we find only little support for our 
hypotheses. The results demonstrates that a higher percentage of non-economists as well as a 
higher percentage of females or/and non-economist significantly increased the overall 
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performance of a bank (model III), i.e. shareholders of such banks lost less money. The 
results further show that a higher professional diversity within executive boards goes along 
with a lower performance of these banks before the financial crisis emerged (model I) 
partially supporting the assumption that such banks to a higher degree prevented 
miscalculations. 
Table 5 about here 
DISCUSSION 
Our research started with the question why managers of banks and their boards had failed to 
see the problems of irrational behavior within the last years and ignored the systematic risks. 
Most managers and boards constantly increased the financial leverage of their banks, which 
not only increased the vulnerability of their bank to the mortgage-backed securities losses but 
also of the whole financial system. One possible reason may be the homogeneity of decision 
makers. Especially within the financial sector directors with non-management backgrounds 
and women are highly underrepresented. Theory shows that in radically changing 
environments in particular experts and men draw wrong conclusions. Experts often reason 
that prior knowledge can be correctly applied to the new situation while men are less sensitive 
by forecasting unlikely negative outcomes. Theory further shows that homogenous groups 
often are prone to group think and that in situations, in which the environment radically 
changes, group think results in poor decision making. Homogenous boardrooms mainly 
consisting of males with an economic background may therefore even multiply the former 
specified forecast errors of individuals.  
Our theoretical expectations were strongly supported by our data. Study 1 has shown that 
female students and students with a non-economic-background were significantly more able 
to predict the collapsing stock market prices of the Swiss bank UBS whereas male students 
with an economic background made by fare the worst predictions. The findings supported 
hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and show that the rationality of individual decision making is 
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systematically bounded. Study 2 partially supported these findings for groups and for decision 
making in a strategic context. The results showed that banks which relied on decision 
committees with a higher percentage of non-economists are less affected by the financial 
crisis. We assumed that such banks were more able to predict the problems of taking on too 
much risk. The data indirectly supported this assumption by showing that before the financial 
crisis the performance of these banks was significantly lower. A likely explanation is that 
diverse boards less heavily supported lucrative "parallel" banking or Credit Default Swap 
which at this time were rewarded by investors and questioned only by few persons. While our 
date supported hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 by showing that a higher percentage of experts resulted 
in poor decision making, we were not able to support the hypotheses for a higher percentage 
of males. Our descriptive results indicate that the hypothesis in all likelihood could be 
supported, preconditioned the actual percentage of females within boards would be higher.   
As a consequence, it might be the case that the financial crisis could have been lessened if the 
leaders and boards in banks had been more diverse. Management team and board diversity 
has been a controversial topic for many years. It has been argued that diversity promotes a 
better understanding of the market place, increases creativity, innovation, and effective 
problem-solving (Adams and Flynn, 2005; Barnes, et al., 2007; Carter, et al., 2003; Erhardt, 
et al., 2003). In line with such arguments some studies demonstrates that board diversity does 
indeed increase firm profit (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; van der Walt, et al., 2006). 
Other authors however reply that diverse boards and management teams are less capable of 
engaging in debates and are therefore less effective (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005; van der 
Walt and Ingley, 2003; Yermack, 1996). In line with these arguments it has been shown that 
there is mixed evidence regarding the effect of team composition on corporate performance 
(de Andres, et al., 2005; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004). These findings are in line with 
diversity literature which shows that diversity has an inverse u-relationship on performance, 
i.e. the diversity in teams should be neither to low nor to high (Perry-Smith and Shalley, 
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2003; Stock, 2005). However, the suggestion that board diversity should lie somewhere in-
between is difficult to implement. As shown in the theory sections, teams with 
overrepresented groups tend to become homogenous in progress with time because the 
majority continuously excludes minorities.  
Criss-cross theory might help companies to achieve an optimal degree of board and 
management team diversity. The term criss-crossing characterizes situations in which exist 
contradictory indicators of group identity (Eiser, 1986), i.e. the same person can be related to 
one group based on one aspect, i.e. to be a male, and to another one based on a different 
aspect, i.e. to be a non-expert (Flap, 1988). The theory thus requires at least two 
characteristics which allow a classification of group members in majority and minority. Our 
paper has discussed the effects of two characteristics, i.e. of gender and expert knowledge, 
which permit this kind of group member classification. In such groups four status 
constellations are possible by subdividing actors into each two subgroups: (1) Males who are 
experts, (2) females who are non-experts, (3) males who are non-experts, (4) females who are 
experts. The majority, e.g. males who are experts, and the minority, women who are non-
experts, are demarcated by visible group borders. The potential for conflicts between both 
subgroups is thus high and it is most possible the majority will try to exclude the minority 
from the group. In contrast, the potential for conflict is low, if some persons do not have a 
clear group affiliation and therefore belong partially to both groups, e.g. males who are non-
experts or females who are experts. Such criss-cross individuals serve as a bridge between the 
otherwise separate groups, i.e. the minority and the majority. They not only confound group 
borders between conflicting parties but also prevent the self-reinforcing homogeneity in 
groups (Flap, 1988). In summary, it seems possible that companies increase the diversity of 
their boards and management teams without simultaneous fostering conflicts and reducing 
effectiveness. They should take into consideration that some individuals serve as a bridge 
between majority and minority. Our sample showed that some banks already include males 
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with non-management backgrounds. However, women with or without a management 
background are still underrepresented in boards. 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The limitations of our research need to be addressed. First, our empirical analysis of study 1 is 
based on a student sample and therefore external validity is doubtful (Harrison and List, 
2004). We tried to enhance external validity by study 2. However, we were not able to 
replicate our findings for gender. For this reasons one should translate our findings carefully 
to the real world. Further research is needed, namely research on real managers and real board 
members, in order to validate our findings. Second, study 1 has the drawback of not being in 
the position to observe real behavior but only to forecast predictions. Further research, 
preferably field experiments, is needed to analyze the effects of gender and expert knowledge 
on performance under uncertainty in applied fields such as in stock corporations. Third, our 
empirical design but as well former empirical designs do not explain why the forecasting 
predictions of women differ from men. We introduced emotions to explain this effect. 
However, emotions have different causes. It might be an inherent feature of women, but it 
might be as well a result of different socialization processes, different network strategies, 
different experiences, or different education. Further research could start to examine gender 
differences more deeply. Fourth, our sample of study 2 is small. Despite the small sample size 
we were able to detect significant effects of diversity on performance. It indicates the 
existence of strong effects. Further research could collect larger samples of financial firms, for 
example by expanding our research question to other countries with more banks. Relying on 
larger samples one might be able to show significant gender effects. Sixth, our research 
question excluded other drivers of forecast errors like on-the-job-training versus final study 
degrees, class origin, ethnic origin etc. These indicators are important for the composition of 
groups and might be important drivers for systematic errors in decision making. Further 
research could expand our research question by contrasting other indicators.  
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CONCLUSION 
Our study has argued that under uncertainty the rationality of individual decision making is 
systematically bounded by showing that women and persons with non-managerial 
backgrounds were by far more able to predict the collapsing stock market prices than men 
with management-related backgrounds. The results can be transferred to strategic 
management: banks which relied on decision committees with a high amount of non-
economists are less affected by the financial crisis. The homogeneity of boards and 
management teams in stock corporations, especially within the financial sector, might 
therefore be detrimental for shareholders and firms.  
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Figure 2. UBS stock price forecasts 
 
Legend: 64 students (13.4% of the overall sample) answered “no idea” and were excluded.  
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Figure 3. Board Structure 2006 of 30 Swiss Banks 
 
Legend: Gender and key course elements of 290 non-executive directors 
 
Legend: Gender and key course elements of 160 executive directors 
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Table 2. Main determinants of the accuracy of forecasting predictions  
 OLS Regression 
Clustered  
OLS Regression 
Ordinal Regression  
(Logit) 
 B SD Sig. B SD Sig. B SD Sig. 
(Constant) 4.07 .28 ** 4.07 .28 **    
Threshold [1; stock price will rise massive]       -4.65 .55 ** 
Threshold [2; stock price will rise]       -2.21 .51 ** 
Threshold [3; stock price will be constant]       -1.04 .50 ** 
Threshold [4; stock price will fall]       .47 .52  
Knowledge                   
Stock market & finance courses -.34  .11  **  -.22  .11  **  -.60  .20  **  
Beliefs                   
Trust in optimal contracts -.24  .08  **  -.21  .09  **  -.35  .15  **  
Demographics          
Male -.31 .11 ** -.31 .14 ** -.45 .20 ** 
R/ Pseudo-R  .28   .23   .26  
R-Square/ Cox and Snell  .08   .05   .07  
Adj. R-Square/ McFadden  .07   .04   .03  
F-Value/ Chi-Square  11.38 **  7.24 **  27.64 ** 
N  411   411   411  
Legend: Dependent variable accuracy of forecasting prediction of the change in the UBS stock price in the next 2 
months. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Table 3. Univariate analysis of variance of the accuracy of forecasting predictions (ANOVA) 
 N Mean B SD Sig. 
Finance courses & Gender           
(Constant)   2.41 .07 ** 
No Finance courses & Female  48  3.25 .74 .16 ** 
No Finance courses & Male  74  2.80 .39 .14 ** 
Finance courses & Female  85  2.76 .36 .13 ** 
Finance courses & Male  205  2.40 .00a   
R-Square   .06   
Adj. R-Square   .05   
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (F-Value)   8.49  ** 
N   411   
Trust in optimal contracts & Gender           
(Constant)   2.38 .08 ** 
Low Trust & Female  82 3.06 .68 .14 ** 
Low Trust & Male  119  2.68 .30 .13 ** 
High Trust & Female  52  2.69 .31 .15 * 
High Trust & Male  161  2.38 .00a   
R-Square   .06   
Adj. R-Square   .05   
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (F-Value)   8.11  ** 
N   411   
Trust in optimal contracts & Finance courses           
(Constant)   2.33 .08 ** 
Low Trust & No Finance courses  72  2.99 .65 .15 ** 
Low Trust & Finance courses 129  2.73 .40 .12 ** 
High Trust & No Finance courses  50  2.86 .53 .17 ** 
High Trust & Finance courses 162  2.33 .00a   
R-Square   .06   
Adj. R-Square   .05   
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (F-Value)   8.75  ** 
N   411   
Legend: Dependent variable accuracy of forecasting prediction of the change in the UBS stock price in the next 2 
months. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.01. a=This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the stock market performance of Banks 
 Model I:  
Performance  
before the  
financial crisis 
(1.1.-1.12.2006) 
Model II:  
Performance  
after the  
financial crisis 
(1.3.2008-1.3.2009) 
Model III:  
Performance  
overall 
(1.3.2006-1.3.2009) 
 B SD Sig. B SD Sig. B SD Sig. 
(Constant) 44.38 12.52 ** -33.99 17.64 † 30.35 27.64  
Non-executive directors          
Percent of Females -24.02 38.01  39.70 53.56  30.60 83.92  
Percent of non-economists -36.50 15.36 * 55.35 21.65 * 67.03 33.92 † 
Control variables          
Number of employees (log.) -.03 1.60  -4.07 2.26 † -5.08 3.54 † 
Type of bank (1=canton) -16.08 6.63 * 28.31 9.35 ** 33.87 14.64 ** 
R  .57   .67   .58  
R-Square  .32   .45   .33  
Adj. R-Square  .21   .36   .23  
F-Value  2.97 *  5.07 **  3.00 * 
N  30   30   30  
(Constant) 45.05 13.13 ** -34.38 18.70 † -33.41 28.44  
Non-executive directors          
Percent of Criss-Cross Ind. -32.35 15.26 * 47.74 21.74 * 63.22 33.07 † 
Control variables          
Number of employees (log.) -.38 1.60  -3.57 2.28  -4.31 3.46  
Type of bank (1=canton) -11.03 5.54 † 20.41 7.90 * 25.70 12.02 * 
R  .53   .64   .57  
R-Square  .28   .40   .32  
Adj. R-Square  .20   .34   .25  
F-Value  3.44 *  5.88 **  4.13 * 
N  30   30   30  
(Constant) 40.77 12.82 ** -34.51 17.03 † -32.29 26.47  
Non-executive directors          
Professional heterogeneity -28.68 16.14 † 60.23 21.44 ** 76.20 33.33 * 
Control variables          
Number of employees (log.) .53 1.67  -5.31 2.21 * -6.53 3.44 † 
Type of bank (1=canton) -12.06 5.61 * 21.26 7.46 ** 26.95 11.59 * 
R  .50   .68   .60  
R-Square  .25   .46   .36  
Adj. R-Square  .17   .40   .28  
F-Value  2.91 †  7.33 **  4.81 ** 
N  30   30   30  
Legend: Dependent variable accuracy of forecasting prediction of the change in the UBS stock price in the next 2 
months. † p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the stock market performance of Banks 
 Model I:  
Performance  
before the  
financial crisis 
(1.1.-1.12.2006) 
Model II:  
Performance  
after the  
financial crisis 
(1.3.2008-1.3.2009) 
Model III:  
Performance  
overall 
(1.3.2006-1.3.2009) 
 B SD Sig. B SD Sig. B SD Sig. 
(Constant) 37.17 13.24 ** -29.07 20.14  -4.79 31.75  
Executive directors          
Percent of Females -30.63 31.59  68.02 48.06  20.51 75.76  
Percent of non-economists 2.63 15.54  -11.91 23.64  7.42 37.27 † 
Control variables          
Number of employees (log.) -1.02 1.83  -1.78 2.79 † -5.15 4.39 † 
Type of bank (1=canton) -15.04 5.64 * 25.87 8.59 ** 29.77 13.53 * 
R  .53   .60   .48  
R-Square  .28   .36   .23  
Adj. R-Square  .16   .25   .10  
F-Value  2.32 †  3.43 *  1.81  
N  30   30   30  
(Constant) 40.76 12.40 ** -18.44 19.55  -3.21 29.35  
Executive directors          
Percent of Criss-Cross Ind. 7.86 14.89  .76 23.46  10.46 35.23 † 
Control variables          
Number of employees (log.) -1.58 1.70  -3.36 2.68  -5.42 4.02  
Type of bank (1=canton) -15.32 5.61 † 24.84 8.83 * 29.71 13.27 * 
R  .51   .55   .48  
R-Square  .26   .30   .23  
Adj. R-Square  .17   .21   .14  
F-Value  2.91 †  3.54 *  2.51 † 
N  30   30   30  
(Constant) 43.28 12.09 ** -17.89 19.24  -3.01 28.83  
Executive directors          
Professional heterogeneity -12.20 13.55 † -4.34 21.57  16.04 32.31  
Control variables          
Number of employees (log.) -1.16 1.71  -3.24 2.72  -5.70 4.07 † 
Type of bank (1=canton) -16.17 5.49 ** 24.66 8.74 ** 29.58 13.09 * 
R  .52   .55   .490  
R-Square  .27   .30   .24  
Adj. R-Square  .19   .21   .15  
F-Value  3.15 *  3.55 *  2.58 † 
N  30   30   30  
Legend: Dependent variable accuracy of forecasting prediction of the change in the UBS stock price in the next 2 
months. † p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
